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conspicuously absent - China. Indeed, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that the TPP has received more attention in China than even in its member countries, as everyone in the country - from government officials to private businessmen, from scholars in the ivory tower to the people in the streets - all flocked to express their thoughts on the new agreement.  
 Among the range of different feelings, panic stands out as the most common. Punning on its funny pronunciation in Chinese (literally means "kick-butt"), doomsayers have called the TPP "butt-kicking" or "kicking China out of the exclusive club". According to them, the TPP heralds the Armageddon for China, which would be an even more terrible onslaught than its accession to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 2001. Indeed, if their admonitions were to be taken seriously, the only option left for China would have been declaring an outright war against all the TPP countries.  
At the other end are the optimists, who brushed off the threat of TPP as little more than theoretical. A widely-circulated article by Shanghai Morning Post reporter Zhang Yizhen, for example, claimed that the exports of the United States ("US") and China will only be up by 0.37% and down by 0.14% respectively.1 
Unfortunately, as with most things in life, neither of the two extreme views is right. 
II. The Optimists  Let’s start with the optimists, with the Zhang article as the leading example. 
First of all, the numbers were wrong. Quoting a 2013 paper by Peng Zhiwei and Zhang Bowei,2 Zhang claimed the TPP’s respective impacts on the exports by the US and China to be +0.37% and -0.14%, respectively. A careful reading of the original paper, however, reveals that these numbers actually refer to the effects on the gross domestic product of the two countries. According to Peng and Zhang, the impacts on the exports are much larger at +3.7% (US) and -0.32% (China), respectively. 
Moreover, even these much-larger numbers could well turn out to be underestimates for the real impacts of the TPP. This is because the Peng & Zhang paper used the Computable General Equilibrium model, which due to its inherent limitations is only useful in measuring the effects of potential tariff concessions. As many TPP members already have rather low tariff rates, the impacts of tariff reductions are indeed rather small. One should remember, however, that the TPP is more than just tariff concessions. Indeed, as a so-called "21st-century" agreement, "20th century" issues such as tariff concessions are but minor features of the TPP. While a thorough analysis of the 
                                                             1 Zhang Yizhen, TPP YAO Guli Fengsuo Zhongguo Jingji? Ni Xuyao Zhidao de Jige Zhenxiang (Will the TPP Isolate the Chinese Economy? Several Truths about the TPP You Need to Know), 6 October2015, available at http://www.weibo.com/p/1001603894737382860057.  2 Peng Zhiwei and Zhang Bowei, TPP he Yatai Zyou Maoyiqu de Jingji Xiaoying ji Zhongguo de Duice (The Economic Effects of TPP and FTAAP and the Options for China), Guoji Maoyi Wenti (Journal of International Trade), Beijing, China, 2013, No. 4, pp, 83-95.  
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tariff schedules of the new TPP agreement remains to be done, as I argued in my 2009 paper, even the original P4 agreement, which was concluded among free-trade champions such as Singapore and New Zealand, has rather modest tariff savings.3 
 Instead, the regulatory integration measures under the TPP will have more significant impacts on global trade flows than the traditional trade integration efforts like tariff reductions. At the relatively simpler level, by adding new twists (such as the yarn-forwarding rule) to existing regulations (rules of origin), the TPP can re-direct the trade flows from non-member countries to member countries. More importantly, by harmonizing the regulatory framework in new areas such as State-Owned Enterprises ("SOEs"), electronic commerce and competition, the TPP will rewrite the rules of trade for the future. 
III. The Doomsayers  While the new TPP rules will definitely divert trade and investment away from China, the situation might not be as hopeless as the doomsayers have predicted. To benefit from the lower tariffs under the TPP, some foreign firms might shift their production bases to the TPP member countries in order to satisfy the rules of origin requirements. However, for products with rather low tariffs pre-TPP, other factors such as lower production costs might make it unworthy to move. Moreover, as the largest market in the world, China will still remain a key destination for foreign investors which wish to gain footholds in the domestic market. 
The bigger challenge lies in the regulatory integration measures under the TPP, which will not only increase the compliance costs for Chinese firms, but also make it more difficult for China to make new rules at the domestic as well as international levels. 
IV. Possible Responses by China?  As the TPP deal is already concluded, China would not be able to shape the rules by joining the TPP negotiations. Instead, the only feasible option left for China is to try to make its own rules. This is essentially what China has been doing for the past two years, and initiatives were taken at three levels. 
First, at the domestic level, China has been introducing various reform measures. Some of these were launched by the Central Government as part of the nation-wide reform plan. Others were first tested in the so-called Free Trade Zones ("FTZs"), which were set up as testing grounds for new regulatory regimes on trade and investment. The problem, however, is that these FTZs, due to their geographical limitations, cannot tackle systemic problems at the national level, such as the role of SOEs or competition issues.  
Second, at the bilateral and regional level, China has been trying to build up its own regional network through Free Trade Agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive 
                                                             3 Henry Gao, The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement: A Critical Analysis, (2010) 37 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Issue 3, pp. 221–240. 
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Economic Partnership Agreement and the "One Belt One Road" initiative. Unfortunately, as many of these initiatives tend to focus on the traditional trade issues and do not address regulatory concerns, they also fail to provide plausible alternatives to the regulatory framework established by the TPP. 
Third, at the global level, China has also been trying very hard to participate in rule-making initiatives in various fora. For example, in the WTO, China actively supported the negotiation on the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Beyond the WTO, China has also been actively seeking participation in other regulatory initiatives such as the Trade in Services Agreement, but unfortunately hasn’t made much progress due to strong resistance from the US. 
V. Concluding Remarks: Opportunities for China and the United States  However, the US should realize that the ultimate goal of the game is not simply "writing the rules" for global economy "before China does",4 but making sure that China plays by the same rules as well. A more effective way to achieve this is to engage China actively rather than leaving it out in the cold. Otherwise, China might well go its own way and formulate new rules against the US. Because the US can have little influence on China’s rule-making efforts at the domestic level, the better alternative would be going through the regional and multilateral channels, especially at the WTO. As the TPP has shown China what the US can achieve without China, it should be more willing to cooperate with the US as well. Thus, to achieve a win-win outcome for both countries, the successful conclusion of the TPP should be used as an opportunity to bring China back to the negotiating table, rather than creating a wall of isolation against China. 
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